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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT TO COUN-
SEL-CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, and he
is allowed to consult with counsel, he may not be subsequently in-
terrogated without his counsel present.
Commonwealth v Santiago, 528 Pa 516, 599 A2d 200 (1991).
Salvator Carlos Santiago ("Santiago") was arrested -by agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") on April 4, 1985 in
Washington, D.C. on a charge of unlawful flight to avoid prosecu-
tion1 for the murder of DeanO'Hara.2 After being advised of his
Miranda rights3 , Santiago chose to remain silent and requested an
attorney.4 On April 5, 1985 an attorney from the Federal Public
Defender's office was appointed and Santiago was arraigned later
that day.5 On April 6, 1985, two detectives from the Pittsburgh Po-
lice Department arrived in Washington, D.C. seeking to interrogate
Santiago relative to the unrelated murder of Patrick Huber. 6 With-
1. The crime of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution is codified at 18 USC § 1073
which provides in pertinent part:
Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent either (1) to
avoid prosecution, or confinement after conviction, under the laws of the place from
which he flees, for a crime, or an attempt to commit a crime, punishable by death or
which is a felony... shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
18 USC § 1073 (1976).
2. Commonwealth v Santiago, 528 Pa 516, 599 A2d 200, 201 (1991). The murder of
Dean O'Hara is unrelated to the crimes that are the subject of this appeal. Santiago, 599
A2d at 201 n 6. Santiago was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life
imprisonment for O'Hara's murder. Id.
3. Under Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), a suspect has the right to remain
silent. If he does speak, anything he says can be used against him. He has the right to
counsel, chosen or appointed. His waiver of these rights must be knowing and intelligent.
Miranda, 384 US at 479.
4. Santiago, 599 A2d at 201.
5. Id. Santiago was represented at trial by Patrick J. Thomassey, Esquire. Brief for
Appellee, No 99 WD Appeal Docket (1986). The appellate record does not indicate the at-
torney from the Office of the Public Defender who was originally assigned to represent Mr.
Santiago. Id.
6. Santiago, 599 A2d at 201. Twenty three year old Patrick Huber, an employee of a
print shop, was shot to death at his place of employment on the South Side of Pittsburgh.
Brief for Appellee, No 99 WD Appeal Docket at 6. He was killed by a single gunshot wound
to the back of the head from a .357 calibre hand gun. Cindy Pasternak, a co-worker of
Huber's arrived at the print shop at 8:40 A.M. and while looking through a storefront win-
dow, observed Santiago going through the owner's desk. When Santiago looked up, Ms. Pas-
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out contacting Santiago's counsel, the Pittsburgh Police detectives
advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and Santiago indi-
cated his willingness to cooperate, and evidenced the same in writ-
ing.' Subsequently, Santiago admitted to killing Huber during a
robbery.'
At trial, Santiago was found guilty of murder in the first degree,9
robbery, 10 and violating the Uniform Firearms Act". A separate
sentencing hearing was held.' 2 The jury, weighing the mitigating
factors against the aggravating factors, found that three aggravat-
ing circumstances existed relative to the murder charge.13 The jury
further found that the aggravating factors outweighed any mitigat-
ing factors'4 and Santiago was sentenced to death.' 5 Post trial mo-
tions were filed, argued, and denied. 6 As a result of the death sen-
ternak fled to a nearby coffee shop and summoned the police. Pittsburgh police officers
arrived minutes later and found Huber lying face down in a storage room. The time of
Huber's death was fixed at between 8:30 A.M. and 8:40 A.M. Id.
7. Santiago, 599 A2d at 201.
8. Id. The print shop robbery netted Santiago approximately ten dollars. Brief for
.Appellee, No 99 WD Appeal Docket at 4.
9. The crime of murder is codified at 18 Pa Cons Stat § 2502 which provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Murder of the first degree. -A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first
degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.
18 Pa Cons Stat § 2502(a) (Purdon 1983).
10. The crime of robbery is codified at 18 Pa Cons Stat § 3701 which provides: "A
person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he inflicts serious bodily
injury upon another[.]" 18 Pa Cons Stat § 3701 (a)(1)(i) (Purdon 1990).
11. The Uniform Firearms Act, codified at 18 Pa Cons Stat § 6106 provides in perti-
nent part:
(a) No person shall carry a firearm in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person,
except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a license therefor as
provided in this subchapter.
18 Pa Cons Stat § 6106(a) (Purdon 1983).
12. Santiago, 599 A2d at 200.
13. Brief for Appellee, No 99 WD Docket at 21. As to aggravating factors, the jury
considered the following: Huber's murder was committed during an armed robbery, Santi-
ago's previous conviction for second degree murder wherein he was sentenced t6 life impris-
onment, and his history of violent crimes. Id.
14. Brief for Appellant, No 99 WD Appeal Docket at 24. Appellant contended that
his history of mental illness was an overwhelming and significant mitigating factor. Id.
15. Santiago, 599 A2d at 200.
16. Id. Appellant raised the following claims:
The verdicts were against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence; the lower court
erred in failing to suppress statements made in violation of Fifth Amendment rights
protected by Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1967) and Edwards v Arizona, 451 US
486 (1981); the arrest warrant lacked probable cause in violation of the Fourth
Amendment; there was unnecessary delay between arrest and preliminary arraign-
ment; and the jury imposed the death penalty without regard to significant mitigating
circumstances in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
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tence, the case was accorded automatic direct appeal to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 17 Justice Cappy, speaking for the
court, relying on the precedent of Minnick v Mississippi,8 rea-
soned that once a defendant invokes a Fifth Amendment 9 right to
counsel, he may not be interrogated as to any crime, so long as he
remains in custody, without notifying his counsel.20 Accordingly,
the judgments of sentence were vacated and the case remanded for
a new trial.2'
Justice McDermott filed a concurring opinion, wherein he stated
that the issues presented by Santiago had prevyously been ad-
dressed in Arizona v Roberson22 and criticized tbe need to add




In 1936 the United States Supreme Court in Brown v Missis-
sippi,2' reacted to charges that a "confession" was obtained by
beating the defendant. The Court held for the first time that-the
reliability of a physically coerced confession was in doubt and
ruled that the confession was inadmissible.25
unusual punishment.
Brief for Appellee, No 99 WD Appeal Docket at 8.
17. Jurisdiction over cases involving the death penalty is codified at 42 Pa Con Stat
Ann § 722(4) which provides that
[t]he Supreme Court [of Pennsylvania] shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals
from final orders of the courts of common pleas in the following classes of cases: ...
(4) Automatic review of sentences as provided by 42 Pa Con Stat Ann § 722(4) (Pur-
don 1981 and Supp 1992).
42 Pa Con Stat Ann § 9711(h) (Purdon 1990). 42 Pa Con Stat Ann § 9711(h)(1) provides
that "A sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania pursuant to its rules." 42 Pa Con Stat Ann § 9711(h)(1) (Purdon 1982 and
Supp 1992).
18. Minnick v Mississippi, 111 S Ct 486 (1990).
19. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part "No person shall ...be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . US Const, Amend V.
20. Santiago, 599 A2d at 202.
21. Id at 203.
22. Arizona v Roberson, 486 US 675 (1988).
23. Santiago, 599 A2d at 203. Justice Larsen joined in the concurring opinion. Id.
24. Brown v Mississippi, 297 US 278 (1936).
25. Brown is a grim reminder of what a criminal justice system can be without consti-
tutional protection. Brown and his two codefendants were charged with the murder of Ray-
mond Stewart. Brown, 297 US at 279. Mr. Stewart was found murdered in his home at 1:00
p.m. on March 30, 1934. Id at 281. There was no evidence to tie the defendants to the crime
other than their "confessions". Id at 279. The defendants were all black men. Id at 281. All
three were beaten and brutally whipped by members of the Sheriff's Department and a
group of white men. At least two of the defendants were whipped, bare backed, with a
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With physical coercion banned as a means of gaining confes-
sions, the Court has been confronted with a number of cases
wherein suspects in custody were.subjected to various psychologi-
cal pressures (as opposed to physical coercion) in an effort to ob-
tain confessions.26 The Court expanded the protection of suspects
by suppressing confessions obtained by psychological pressure by
requiring that the confessions be made "voluntarily".27 However,
the-test for voluntariness proved unworkable in practice.2
In 1966, the Court moved from the voluntariness test and articu-
lated "guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to fol-
low" in Miranda v Arizona.29 In Miranda, the Court set specific
buckled, leather strap while in jail. Id at 282. One of the defendants was hung from a tree
with a rope and let down, but he still protested his innocence. He was hung a second time,
again let down, and again proclaimed his innocence. Id at 281. He was allowed to return to
his home that evening, but the following day was subjected to beatings at the hands of the
sheriff's deputies and civilian white men. Eventually all three defendants succumbed to
their torturous treatment and confessed. Id at 282. In fact, as the beatings progressed, the
confessions were changed to comport with their interrogators' demands. Id at 284. At trial,
the officers not only did not dispute the whippings, but admitted to same. Id. Notwithstand-
ing the whippings and the rope burns openly visible at trial, the "confessions" were admit-
ted over the defendants' objections. Id at 283. The defendants were found guilty in a two
day trial and sentenced to death on April 6, 1934-just seven days after the body of Ray-
mond Stewart was discovered! Id at 279.
26. See for example, United States v Griffin, 922 F2d 1343, 1351 (8th Cir 1990) (of-
ficers took advantage of the suspect's alien status and confronted him with false or mislead-
ing witness statements.); United States v Olof, 527 F2d 752, 753 (9th Cir 1975) (interrogat-
ing agent told the suspect "that prison was a 'dark place', where they 'pumped air' to the
prisoners."); Rodgers v Richmond, 365 US 534, 538 (1961) (interrogating officers threatened
to arrest the suspect's sick wife if he failed to cooperate.)
27. The "voluntariness" test evolved from Rodgers, 365 US at 538 (see note 26 and
accompanying text) and its predecessor Spano v New York, 360 US 315, 320 (1959), (confes-
sion induced by police officer tricking suspect held to be involuntary).
28. Alan Carlos Blanco, Its Better The Second Time Around - Reinterrogation Of
Custodial Suspects Under Oregon v Bradshaw. 45 U Pitt L Rev 899, 905 (1984).
The voluntariness test proved in practice to be an administratively unsatisfactory
way of reaching these goals. (The goals that Blanco refers to are: [1] barring use of
unreliable confessions; [2] deterring offensive police practices; and [3] prohibiting use
of confessions obtained under circumstances in which the defendant's free choice was
significantly impaired.) In the thirty years between Brown v Mississippi and Mi-
randa, the Court took an average of about one confession case per year, two thirds of
which were death penalty cases.
Blanco, 45 U Pitt L Rev at 905 (citations omitted).
29. Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). The Miranda decision embodied four
separate appeals, all of which involved custodial interrogation without any advice to the
defendants as to their constitutional rights. Miranda, 384 US at 440. All four defendants
were convicted in trial court. Id. Three had their convictions overturned by the Supreme
Court for failure to give advice to the defendants as to their constitutional rights. Id at 492-
9. The fourth defendant, Stewart, had his conviction overturned by the Supreme Court of
California and the United States Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Id. Justices Black,
Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas joined in Chief Justice Warren's opinion. Id at 436. Justice
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guidelines requiring that before custodial interrogation begins, the
suspect must be advised that he has a right to remain silent, that if
he does speak, any statements he makes can be used against him,
that he has a right to counsel (retained or appointed), and that the
suspect must make an intelligent waiver of those rights.30 The Mi-
randa holding also requires that if the suspect wishes to consult
with an attorney, questioning must cease until an attorney is
present."
In 1981 in Edwards v Arizona, the Court reaffirmed that once a
suspect requests an attorney, questioning must cease and may not
resume until the attorney is made available.3 " Edwards was sus-
pected of robbery and first degree murder.3 3 Once under arrest he
was given his Miranda warnings and agreed to cooperate.3 4 During
interrogation, he had a change of mind, and requested an attorney
and the interrogation ceased.3 5 The following day, police returned
to question him again." Although he initially objected to speaking
with his interrogators, Edwards eventually confessed.3 7 The Ari-
zona Supreme Court rejected Edward's argument that Miranda
did not allow a suspect to change his mind pursuant to a renewed
police inquiry. 8 The Arizona court found that Edwards voluntarily
responded to the police questions and in effect waived his right to
counsel.3 9 The United States Supreme Court rejected that reason-
Clark concurred in the result as to Stewart, and filed a dissent as to the other three defend-
ants. Id at 499. Justice White filed a separate dissent wherein Justices Harlan and Stewart
joined. Id at 526. Harlan, J. filed a separate dissent, wherein Justices Stewart and White
joined. Id at 504.
Miranda was suspected of kidnap and rape. Id at 492. Within two hours of his arrest, he
gave police a signed confession. The statement contained a typed statement that he had
"full knowledge" of his "legal rights". Id. There was no suggestion that the confession was
the result of any coercion, or improper conduct on the part of the interrogating officers. Id
at 519 (Harlan dissenting). Notwithstanding that, the majority held that his waiver of his
constitutional protections did not meet the "knowing and intelligent" standard. Id at 492.
30. Id at 479.
31. Id at 473-74.
32. Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981).
33. Edwards, 451 US at 478.
34. Id at 479.
-35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. It should be noted that Edwards never consulted with an attorney. When the
police returned to question him the second time, Edwards refused to talk, but was told he
had no choice. When confronted with a tape recording of an alleged accomplice implicating
Edwards in the crimes, he confessed. Id at 478.
38. State v Edwards, 122 Ariz 206, 594 P2d 72, 78 (1979) (en banc), rev'd sub nom,
Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981).
39. Edwards, 594 P2d at 78.
1993
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ing, insisting that for the suspect's waiver to be effective, the
proper inquiry should have been whether the suspect's waiver was
a "knowing and intelligent40 relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege". 41 The Court recognized that there can be
situations where an accused may validly waive his Fifth Amend-
ment rights, but that waiver cannot be shown by the simple fact
that the suspect responded to police interrogation, even though he
has been advised of his rights. 42 As such, the Court held that Ed-
wards did not waive his Fifth Amendment rights.43 While this
would have been sufficient to overturn Edwards' conviction, the
Court went on in dictum to impose an additional safeguard, insist-
ing that once a suspect requests counsel the police must cease in-
terrogation and may not reinterrogate until counsel is made availa-
ble or the suspect initiates further communication." The Court
further stated that had Edwards "initiated" the second meeting,
the police would have been free to listen to any statements volun-
teered and could have used them at trial.45 The Court noted, how-
ever, that if the suspect had initiated the second meeting and po-
40. Id. The "knowing and intelligent waiver" was elucidated in Johnson v Zerbst, 304
US 458 (1938). There the defendant was accused of passing counterfeit currency and repre-
sented himself throughout trial and during the initial post trial appeal period. The Court
pointed out that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of funda-
mental constitutional rights. Further, "[t]he determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused.". Johnson, 304 US at 465.
41. Edwards, 451 US at 482.
42. Id at 484.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id at 485. For a discussion of what constitutes "initiation," see Oregon v Brad-
shaw, 462 US 1039 (1983) and Allen F. Loucks, Initiation: The Emperor's New Test, 53 Geo
Wash L Rev 608 (1985). In Bradshaw,the defendant was arrested regarding an automobile
accident in which a minor was killed. While in custody, and after asserting his right to
counsel, Bradshaw asked his police hosts, "[wiell, what is going to happen to me now?"
After a discussion of possible alternatives facing the accused, he confessed to his involve-
ment in the accident. Eight Justices of the Bradshaw court held that the defendant's in-
quiry did not rise to the level of "initiation".
Quoting Loucks,
[b]ecause initiation must relate directly to the events of the crime, courts must view
non-initiation as the status quo. Courts must search for an initiating statement and
may not infer or presume its existence. Moreover, because suspects have claimed a
specific and important right to counsel, courts should assume that suspects wish to
retain that posture. The prevailing presumption must be, in the absence of initiating
statements that clearly demonstrate a suspect's intention to speak about the crime,
that no initiation occurred.
Loucks, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 623.
446
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lice interjected a question during the "volunteered" confession, the
dialogue between the police and the suspect reverts to a "custodial
interrogation" and would have required that the suspect make a
valid waiver of his rights before the interrogation continues. 46
Speaking for the six member majority,47 Justice White opined that
once an accused had "expressed his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel [he was] not subject to further interrogation
. . . until counsel [was] made available".48
Several years later, in 1988, a twist of the facts of Edwards
caused the Court to again address this issue in Arizona v Rober-
son.49 In Roberson, the suspect was arrested at the scene of a bur-
glary.50 He refused to respond to police inquiries, and requested
the assistance of counsel.5 1 Three days later while Roberson was
still in custody, a police officer working on a separate and indepen-
dent investigation gave Roberson his Miranda warnings and ques-
tioned him about the unrelated burglary.52 The police officer was
not present during Roberson's arrest and was unaware that counsel
had been requested at the time of his arrest.53 Roberson gave the
police an incriminating statement concerning the previous bur-
glary, but the trial court, relying on the Edwards rule as inter-
preted in State v Routhier,54 suppressed Roberson's statement.5
The prosecution appealed the suppression order, but it was af-
firmed by the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme
46. Edwards, 451 US at 486 n 9.
47. Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, J.J. joined in White's, J.,
opinion. Id at 478.
48. Edwards, 451 US at 483.
49. Arizona v Roberson, 486 US 675 (1988).




54. State v Routhier, 137 Ariz 90, 669 P2d 68 (1983), cert denied, 464 US 1073
(1984). Routhier was accused of murdering Lawrence Barrick during an attempted robbery.
He was apprehended after a high speed chase wherein he was involved in an accident that
required his hospitalization. While in the hospital, he was interrogated by police . He coop-
erated during the initial phase of interrogation, and signed a waiver of his Miranda rights.
However during the interrogation, he expressed his desire to consult with counsel and the
interrogation was terminated. Three days later, a second police officer (who was aware of the
defendant's request for counsel) visited the defendant with the intention of seeking infor-
mation about an unrelated homicide. During this second interrogation, the defendant ad-
mitted to the Barrick murder. The trial court admitted the confession over the defendant's
objection. The Supreme Court of Arizona overturned Routhier's conviction, holding that
Edwards v Arizona required the suppression of the confession in that Routhier had re-
quested counsel. Routhier, 669 P2d at 68.
55. Roberson, 486 US at 678.
1993
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Court denied a petition for review. 56
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
conflicts with other state court decisions." Justice Stevens, speak-
ing for the majority and quoting the Arizona Supreme Court,5
stated that there was no legal significance to the factual difference
(of Edwards) that the reinterrogation concerned an unrelated of-
fense." Once a suspect raises his Fifth Amendment right to coun-
sel, there can be no reinterrogation until counsel has been ap-
pointed to counteract the inherent pressures of custodial
interrogation, even where the confession relates to a separate and
independent investigation. 0
Justice Kennedy filed a dissent criticizing the majority for ad-
ding yet another per se rule.6 1 His opinion focused on the goal of
the Edwards rule - to protect a suspect in police custody from be-
ing badgered by police authorities." Inasmuch as the reinterroga-
tion pertained to an entirely'different investigation, Justice Ken-
nedy saw little risk that the suspect would be badgered into
submission. 3
In Minnick v Mississippi,4 the Court further clarified its posi-
tion on a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to counsel.6 In that
case, Minnick was a suspect in a dual murder in Mississippi.6 He
was subsequently arrested in California and, after being advised
his rights, told FBI agents that he wanted to talk to a lawyer."7 A
lawyer was appointed and Minnick conferred with him at least
twice. 8 A deputy sheriff from Mississippi went to California seek-
ing to interrogate Minnick. Minnick was advised by his jailers that
he would have to talk and could not refuse.69 Minnick was advised
of his rights, but refused to sign a waiver, although he did give the
56. Id at 679. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicts
with other state court decisions. Id.
57. Id at 678.
58. Id at 678 quoting Routhier, 669 P2d at 75.
59. Roberson, 486 US at 678.
60. Id.
61. Id at 688.
62. Id. Justice Kennedy dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
63. Id.
64. 111 S Ct 486 (1990).
65. Minnick, 111 S Ct at 480.






deputy sheriff a statement.7"
The Mississippi trial court construed the language of Edwards as
requiring that once a suspect has exercised his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel has been
appointed; however, once counsel was made available, his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel was satisfied.
71
The United States Supreme Court rejected that analysis, holding
that "the Fifth Amendment protection of Edwards was not termi-
nated or suspended by consultation with counsel" 2 Justice Ken-
nedy (the author of the Edwards dissent) writing for the Court
further stressed the point when he went on to state that "when
counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may
not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not
the accused has consulted with his attorney".73
When analyzing the uncompromising holding of Minnick, a look
back to the opinion of Miranda is necessary. The seminal case of
Miranda requires law enforcement agencies to cease custodial
questioning once the suspect asserts his Fifth Amendment right to
consult with an attorney. Miranda, however, is unclear as to
whether law enforcement agencies are free to resume their ques-
tioning at some later point in time. While subsequent questioning
could arguably meet the letter of Miranda, it would just as obvi-
ously undermine its spirit. 4
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court in Edwards v Arizona
made clear that if the suspect requests counsel, the questioning
must cease and may not resume at any time until an attorney is
made available to the suspect.75
In 1988 the Court expanded the Edward's bar against subse-
70. Id at 489.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id at 491. Note that the opinion is joined by White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens
and O'Connor, J.J. Souter, J., took no part in the consideration or decision. Scalia, J., filed a
dissent, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., wherein he challenged the majority's irrebuttable pre-
sumption that a criminal suspect can never validly waive his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel once he asserts same. Scalia would permit such statements for the consideration of
the fact finder if the state can meet the high standard of proof that the suspect waived his
constitutional rights. Scalia was disturbed by the lack of any showing that Minnick did not
know his rights or was coerced into abandoning same. Id at 492-97.
74. See generally Minnick, 111 S Ct at 491. The need for counsel to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to ques-
tioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.
Minnick, 111 S Ct at 491 quoting Miranda, 384 US at 470.
75. Edwards, 451 US at 484. See note 51 and accompanying text.
1993 449
Duquesne Law Review
quent interrogation in Arizona v Roberson, when the Court held
that once a suspect requests counsel, all questioning must cease
and barred police authorities from questioning the suspect about
any crime, until the suspect had the opportunity to consult with
an attorney." To this reader, the Court's intent was clear - once a
suspect indicates his belief that he is incapable of dealing with po-
lice authorities without the benefit of counsel, he may not be ques-
tioned by any police authorities as to any crime(s) until he has had
the opportunity to consult with his attorney.
Less clear was the question of whether Edwards and Roberson
created a per se rule that excluded any confession (elicited after
the suspect invoked his right to counsel) if it followed police initi-
ated conversation with the suspect. New Jersey's highest court
read Edwards as creating a per se rule, barring "reinterrogation of
all criminal suspects who invoked their right to counsel unless [the
suspect] initiated further conversation." The Supreme Court of
Connecticut, however, reached the opposite conclusion: although
Edwards prohibited police initiated reinterrogation, it permitted
the introduction of confessions elicited by police initiated "conver-
sations" with the accused.7" Six years later, Justice Kennedy in his
dissent in Roberson, citing Oregon v Bradshaw,79 recognized that
the rule in Edwards "was in fact a prophylactic rule, designed to
protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police
officers . . .",so
While clearing up some of the nebulous aspects of Miranda, Ed-
wards and Roberson left unanswered the question of whether, once
the attorney has been appointed and the suspect has had an op-
portunity to consult with his counsel, law enforcement agencies are
then free to question the suspect, and if so, to what extent? If Ed-
wards and Roberson are interpreted to permit custodial interroga-
tion after such "post attorney-client consultation", then policing
the interrogations could become a burden on the courts. Initially
the Court has recognized that determining what constitutes a
"consultation" is no easy matter.8 " For example, would a telephone
76. Roberson, 486 US at 690). See notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
77. State v McCloskey, 90 NJ 18, 446 A2d 1201 (1982).
78. State v Acquin, 187 Conn 674, 448 A2d 165 (1982).
79. Oregon v Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1044 (1983).
80. Roberson, 486 US at 690.
81. Minnick, 111 S Ct at 492. In Minnick the Court stated "This case illustrates also
that consultation is not always effective in instructing the suspect of his rights." Id at 491.
The Court also determined that "[c]onsultation is not a precise concept... it may encom-
pass variations from a telephone call to say that the attorney is in route, to a hurried in-
Vol. 31:441450
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conversation regarding the amount of the suspect's bail constitute
an attorney/client consultation? Assuming arguendo that the sus-
pect did indeed have a meaningful consultation with his attorney,
what limits should the Court place on the police insofar as the
number and duration of interrogations? Rather than delve into
this quagmire of vagaries, the Court sought to lay down a rule that
provides lower courts and police agencies with "clear and unequiv-
ocal guidelines" to follow.8 2 The rule as enunciated in Minnick v
Mississippi is a model in simplicity - the protection of Edwards
does not terminate once counsel has consulted with the suspect.
8 3
The Court, in addressing the competing interests, 4 admitted that
its decision in favor of a rule that embodied clarity of command
and certainty of its application also has its shortcomings. The
Court recognized that since its rule required that a voluntary state-
ment (under traditional Fifth Amendment analysis), obtained in
absence of counsel after a suspect has asserted his Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel, even though trustworthy and highly proba-
tive, must be suppressed. 5
In its effort to craft a rule that provides ease of application the
Court has gone far beyond the issues raised in Brown and Mi-
randa6 and has created " . . .an irrebuttable presumption that a
criminal suspect, after invoking his Miranda right to counsel, can
never validly waive that right during any police initiated encoun-
ter, even after the suspect .. .has actually consulted his attor-
ney."8 7 The good faith of interrogating officers (or lack of any
showing that police badgered the defendant into waiving his
rights) is of no import. While the Minnick rule should provide ease
of administration and a degree of judicial economy, Justice Scalia
argues " .. . so would a rule that simply excludes all confessions
by all persons in police custody."8 8 Justice Scalia is correct in his
observation. However it should be pointed out that Minnick would
terchange .. .in a corridor, to a lengthy in-person conference in which the attorney gives
full and adequate advice respecting all matters that might be covered in further interroga-
tions." Id at 492.
82. Roberson, 486 US at 682.
83. Minnick, 111 S Ct at 491.
84. Justice Stevens compared the "virtues of a bright line rule" and found that they
outweighed the burdens placed on law enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring the
suppression of these "voluntary" confessions. Roberson, 486 US at 681.
85. Id.
86. Brown v Mississippi, 297 US 278 (1936) (physical coercion); and Miranda, 384
US at 436 (psychological coercion).
87. Minnick, 111 S Ct at 492 (Justice Scalia dissenting).
88. Id at 495.
1993
Duquesne Law Review V
only preclude statements obtained in absence of counsel during
police initiated interrogation after the right to counsel has been
asserted. Police are still free to accept statements where the sus-
pect initiates the confession. Further, the police are free to interro-
gate the suspect in the presence of counsel. As Justice Kennedy
noted in Minnick, under the reasoning of the Arizona Supreme
Court (that once a suspect has consulted with his attorney he is
then subject to police interrogation), if a suspect exercises his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel and faces police interrogation after he
has had an opportunity for consultation, the suspect whose attor-
ney is timely in consulting with his client is at a disadvantage
when compared with the suspect whose attorney is dilatory." The
Minnick rule disposes with this concern-unless the attorney is
present, a suspect that has asserted his right to counsel may not be
questioned as to any criminal activities-period.
We now come full circle and return to Santiago.9 0 What, if any-
thing, did the Pennsylvania Supreme Court add to this issue? It
would be tempting to answer that query by saying it added' noth-
ing-that the Pennsylvania court's hands were tied and it must
comport with precedent.9 1 However, the brevity of this opinion
says at least one thing: the "clarity of command and certainty of
application" 9 that the United States Supreme Court was attempt-
ing to achieve has apparently been attained. 3 The Pennsylvania
89. Id at 492.
90. As to the factual differences between Minnick and Santiago, in Minnick police
authorities "re-initiated" the custodial interrogation. Minnick, 111 S Ct at 488. In Santiago,
the Pittsburgh police detectives were commencing an "initial" interrogation as to crimes
unrelated to those for which the defendant was in custody. Santiago, 599 A2d at 202. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on McNeil v Wisconsin, 111 S Ct 2204, (1991), sum-
marily disposed of any legal significance to the factual disparities. Santiago, 599 A2d at 202.
91. Indeed, Justice McDermott has expressed this feeling in his concurring opinion
wherein he stated "[g]iven the United States Supreme Court decision [in Roberson] I am
constrained to agree with the majority's decision iri this case." Santiago 599 A2d at 203
(McDermott concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Larsen joined in this concurrence.
92. Minnick, 111 S Ct at 490.
93. At least one jurisdiction does not read Minnick as imposing a prophylactic rule.
In Connecticut v Dobson, 221 Conn 128, 602 A2d 977 (1992), Dobson was arrested for mur-
der. Dobson, 602 A2d at 978. The defendant after being advised his Miranda rights, told the
police officers that he- would answer questions, but would not sign a statement until he
spoke with his attorney. Id at 979. The defendant made several telephone calls to his attor-
ney, but was unable to speak with him. He eventually made an oral confession, that was
admitted at trial over the defendant's objection. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court distin-
guished Minnick, stating "[Minnick] invoked his right to counsel for all purposes. Here, it is
equally apparent that there was only a limited invocation of that right for written state-
ments; the defendant repeatedly asserted his willingness to make oral statements to the
police." Id at 981.
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court affirms its understanding that the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel "barred officials from interrogating [the suspect] regarding
any... offense without the presence of counsel.""" The concurring
opinion in Santiago quotes Justice Scalia's dissent in Minnick,
wherein he complains that we "do not need yet another per se rule
which inures only to the benefit of confessing felons"es-but the
opinion recognizes that we do in fact have another per se rule!
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has re-affirmed the simplicity
of the high Court's edict: once a suspect invokes a non-offense spe-
cific right to counsel, the suspect can never be questioned again
without the presence of counsel.9 6 The maxim nemo tenetur seip-
sum accusare97 has never been more true.
Colin Meneely
Justice Berdon filed a dissent challenging the narrow interpretation of Minnick. Id at 984.
To quote.Justice Berdon, "It is now beyond debate that if the individual in custody states
that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present ... by
sending [the police officer] to get a statement from the defendant after his second request
for counsel, the police committed a clear violation of his right to be free of police initiated
interrogation without counsel present." Id (Berdon dissenting).
94. Santiago 599 A2d at 202.
95. Id at 203 (McDermott concurring).
96. To this reader, it is incredulous that the highest court of Connecticut has failed
to understand the simplicity of the rule in Minnick and apply the same in Dobson.
97. No one shall be compelled to accuse himself.
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